G.R. No. 190823, April 04, 2011
Topics
contract of sale; elements
Summary
Petitioner entered into a contract of over a parcel of land with defined metes and bounds. Petitioner died during the pendency of the apeal.
Doctrines
The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. In the causes of action which survive, the wrong complained of affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive, the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected being incidental.
Facts
On July 10, 1990, Domingo Carabeo (petitioner) entered into a contract denominated as “Kasunduan sa Bilihan ng Karapatan sa Lupa” (kasunduan) with Spouses Norberto and Susan Dingco (respondents) whereby petitioner agreed to sell his rights over a 648 square meter parcel of unregistered land situated in Purok III, Tugatog, Orani, Bataan to respondents for ₱38,000.
Respondents tendered their initial payment of ₱10,000 upon signing of the contract, the remaining balance to be paid on September 1990.
Respondents were later to claim that when they were about to hand in the balance of the purchase price, petitioner requested them to keep it first as he was yet to settle an on-going “squabble” over the land.
Nevertheless, respondents gave petitioner small sums of money from time to time which totaled ₱9,100, on petitioner’s request according to them; due to respondents’ inability to pay the amount of the remaining balance in full, according to petitioner.
By respondents’ claim, despite the alleged problem over the land, they insisted on petitioner’s acceptance of the remaining balance of ₱18,900, but petitioner remained firm in his refusal, proffering as reason therefor that he would register the land first.
Sometime in 1994, respondents learned that the alleged problem over the land had been settled and that petitioner had caused its registration in his name on December 21, 1993 under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 161806. They thereupon offered to pay the balance but petitioner declined, drawing them to file a complaint before the Katarungan Pambarangay. No settlement was reached, however, hence, respondent filed a complaint for specific performance before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Balanga, Bataan.
Petitioner countered in his Answer to the Complaint that the sale was void for lack of object certain, the kasunduan not having specified the metes and bounds of the land. In any event, petitioner alleged that if the validity of the kasunduan is upheld, respondents’ failure to comply with their reciprocal obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price would render the action premature. For, contrary to respondents’ claim, petitioner maintained that they failed to pay the balance of ₱28,000 on September 1990 to thus constrain him to accept installment payments totaling ₱9,100.
After the case was submitted for decision or on January 31, 2001, petitioner passed away. The records do not show that petitioner’s counsel informed Branch 1 of the Bataan RTC, where the complaint was lodged, of his death and that proper substitution was effected in accordance with Section 16, Rule 3, Rules of Court.3
By Decision of February 25, 2001,4 the trial court ruled in favor of respondents.
Issues:
- Whether the contract of sale was void for the absence of an object.
- Whether the contract of sale was void for lack of spousal consent.
- Whether the judgment is valid and binding despite being rendered after the death of petitioner.
Ruling
- NO. The pertinent portion of the kasunduan reads:
x x x x
Na ako ay may isang partial na lupa na matatagpuan sa Purok 111, Tugatog, Orani Bataan, na may sukat na 27 x 24 metro kuwadrado, ang nasabing lupa ay may sakop na dalawang punong santol at isang punong mangga, kaya’t ako ay nakipagkasundo sa mag-asawang Norby Dingco at Susan Dingco na ipagbili sa kanila ang karapatan ng nasabing lupa sa halagang ₱38,000.00.
x x x x
That the kasunduan did not specify the technical boundaries of the property did not render the sale a nullity. The requirement that a sale must have for its object a determinate thing is satisfied as long as, at the time the contract is entered into, the object of the sale is capable of being made determinate without the necessity of a new or further agreement between the parties. As the above-quoted portion of the kasunduan shows, there is no doubt that the object of the sale is determinate.
- NO. This was raised only on appeal, hence, will not be considered, in the present case, in the interest of fair play, justice and due process.
- YES. Respecting the argument that petitioner’s death rendered respondents’ complaint against him dismissable, Bonilla v. Barcena enlightens:
The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. In the causes of action which survive, the wrong complained of affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive, the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected being incidental.
In the present case, respondents are pursuing a property right arising from the kasunduan, whereas petitioner is invoking nullity of the kasunduan to protect his proprietary interest. Assuming arguendo, however, that the kasunduan is deemed void, there is a corollary obligation of petitioner to return the money paid by respondents, and since the action involves property rights, it survives.
It bears noting that trial on the merits was already concluded before petitioner died. Since the trial court was not informed of petitioner’s death, it may not be faulted for proceeding to render judgment without ordering his substitution. Its judgment is thus valid and binding upon petitioner’s legal representatives or successors-in-interest, insofar as his interest in the property subject of the action is concerned.
In another vein, the death of a client immediately divests the counsel of authority. Thus, in filing a Notice of Appeal, petitioner’s counsel of record had no personality to act on behalf of the already deceased client who, it bears reiteration, had not been substituted as a party after his death. The trial court’s decision had thereby become final and executory, no appeal having been perfected.