G.R. NO. 134971 (March 25, 2004)
Topics: preliminary injunction as a remedy
Summary:
Owners of parcels of agricultural land refused to enter into a deed of sale with petitioner. Petitioner asked the court to fix the price for the purchase of land.
Doctrines:
A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event calculated to preserve or maintain the status quo of things ante litem and is generally availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts, until the merits of the case can be heard.
Facts:
Respondents Angelica Tiotuyco Vda. de Lacson, and her children Amancia, Antonio, Juan, and Teodosia, all surnamed Lacson, were the registered owners of three parcels of land located in Mabalacat, Pampanga. The properties, which were tenanted agricultural lands, were administered by Renato Espinosa for the owner.
On March 17, 1996, a group of original farmers/tillers, individually executed in favor of the petitioner separate Deeds of Assignment in which the assignees assigned to the petitioner their respective rights as tenants/tillers of the landholdings possessed and tilled by them for and in consideration of P50.00 per square meter.
The said amount was made payable “when the legal impediments to the sale of the property to the petitioner no longer existed.” The petitioner was also granted the exclusive right to buy the property if and when the respondents, with the concurrence of the defendants-tenants, agreed to sell the property. In the interim, the petitioner gave varied sums of money to the tenants as partial payments, and the latter issued receipts for the said amounts.
On July 24, 1996, the petitioner called a meeting of the defendants-tenants to work out the implementation of the terms of their separate agreements. However, on August 8, 1996, the defendants-tenants, through Joven Mariano, wrote the petitioner stating that they were not attending the meeting and instead gave notice of their collective decision to sell all their rights and interests, as tenants/lessees, over the landholding to the respondents. Explaining their reasons for their collective decision.
On August 19, 1996, the petitioner filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 44, against the defendants-tenants, as well as the respondents, for the court to fix a period within which to pay the agreed purchase price of P50.00 per square meter to the defendants, as provided for in the Deeds of Assignment.
The petitioner also prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction against the defendants and the respondents therein.
The respondents, filed a Comment/Motion to dismiss/deny the petitioner’s plea for injunctive relief on the following grounds:
(a) the Deeds of Assignment executed by the defendants-tenants were contrary to public policy and P.D. No. 27 and Rep. Act No. 6657;
(b) the petitioner failed to prove that the respondents induced the defendants-tenants to renege on their obligations under the “Deeds of Assignment;”
(c) not being privy to the said deeds, the respondents are not bound by the said deeds; and,
(d) the respondents had the absolute right to sell and dispose of their property and to encumber the same and cannot be enjoined from doing so by the trial court.
On February 13, 1997, the court issued an Order denying the motion of the respondents for being premature. It directed the hearing to proceed for the respondents to adduce their evidence. The court ruled that the petitioner, on the basis of the material allegations of the complaint, was entitled to injunctive relief. It also held that before the court could resolve the petitioner’s plea for injunctive relief, there was need for a hearing to enable the respondents and the defendants-tenants to adduce evidence to controvert that of the petitioner.
The respondents, the petitioners therein, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals for the nullification of the February 13, 1997 and April 16, 1997 Orders of the trial court.
On April 17, 1998, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision against the petitioner, annulling and setting aside the assailed orders of the trial court; and permanently enjoining the said trial court from proceeding with Civil Case No. 10901.
Issues:
- Whether it was premature for the appellate court to determine the merits of his case, since no evidentiary hearing on the merits of his complaint had yet been conducted by the trial court.
- Whether The RTC Committed a Grave Abuse of Discretion Amounting to Excess or Lack of Jurisdiction in Issuing its February 13, 1997 and April 16, 1997 Orders
- Whether the Appellate Court erred in permanently enjoining the RTC form continuing with the proceedings in Civil Case No. 10910.
Ruling:
- NO. The motion of the respondents to dismiss/deny the petitioner’s plea for a writ of preliminary injunction after the petitioner had adduced his evidence, testimonial and documentary, and had rested his case on the incident, was proper and timely.
It bears stressing that the petitioner had the burden to prove his right to a writ of preliminary injunction. He may rely solely on the material allegations of his complaint or adduce evidence in support thereof. The petitioner adduced his evidence to support his plea for a writ of preliminary injunction against the respondents and the defendants-tenants and rested his case on the said incident.
The respondents then had three options:
(a) file a motion to deny/dismiss the motion on the ground that the petitioner failed to discharge his burden to prove the factual and legal basis for his plea for a writ of preliminary injunction and, if the trial court denies his motion, for them to adduce evidence in opposition to the petitioner’s plea;
(b) forgo their motion and adduce testimonial and/or documentary evidence in opposition to the petitioner’s plea for a writ of preliminary injunction; or,
(c) waive their right to adduce evidence and submit the incident for consideration on the basis of the pleadings of the parties and the evidence of the petitioner.
The respondents opted not to adduce any evidence, and instead filed a motion to deny or dismiss the petitioner’s plea for a writ of preliminary injunction against them, on their claim that the petitioner failed to prove his entitlement thereto.
The trial court cannot compel the respondents to adduce evidence in opposition to the petitioner’s plea if the respondents opt to waive their right to adduce such evidence. Thus, the trial court should have resolved the respondents’ motion even without the latter’s opposition and the presentation of evidence thereon.
- YES. In its February 13, 1997 Order, the trial court ruled that the petitioner was entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction against the respondents on the basis of the material averments of the complaint. In its April 16, 1997 Order, the trial court denied the respondents’ motion for reconsideration of the previous order, on its finding that the petitioner was entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction based on the material allegations of his complaint.
A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event calculated to preserve or maintain the status quo of things ante litem and is generally availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts, until the merits of the case can be heard.
For the court to issue a writ of preliminary injunction, the petitioner was burdened to establish the following:
1) a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be protected;
(2) a violation of that right;
(3) that there is an urgent and permanent act and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
Thus, in the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive writ constitutes a grave abuse of discretion.
We have reviewed the pleadings of the parties and found that, as contended by the respondents, the petitioner failed to establish the essential requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Hence, the trial court committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in denying the respondents’ comment/motion as well as their motion for reconsideration.
First. The trial court cannot enjoin the respondents, at the instance of the petitioner, from selling, disposing of and encumbering their property. As the registered owners of the property, the respondents have the right to enjoy and dispose of their property without any other limitations than those established by law, in accordance with Article 428 of the Civil Code.
Second. A reading the averments of the complaint will show that the petitioner clearly has no cause of action against the respondents for the principal relief prayed for therein, for the trial court to fix a period within which to pay to each of the defendants-tenants the balance of the P50.00 per square meter, the consideration under the Deeds of Assignment executed by the defendants-tenants. The respondents are not parties or privies to the deeds of assignment. The matter of the period for the petitioner to pay the balance of the said amount to each of the defendants-tenants is an issue between them, the parties to the deed.
- YES. We agree with the petitioner’s contention that the appellate court erred when it permanently enjoined the RTC from continuing with the proceedings in Civil Case No. 10910. The only issue before the appellate court was whether the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in denying the respondents’ motion to deny or dismiss the petitioner’s plea for a writ of preliminary injunction.
Not one of the parties prayed to permanently enjoin the trial court from further proceeding with Civil Case No. 10910 or to dismiss the complaint. It bears stressing that the petitioner may still amend his complaint, and the respondents and the defendants-tenants may file motions to dismiss the complaint.
By permanently enjoining the trial court from proceeding with Civil Case No. 10910, the appellate court acted arbitrarily and effectively dismissed the complaint motu proprio, including the counterclaims of the respondents and that of the defendants-tenants. The defendants-tenants were even deprived of their right to prove their special and affirmative defenses