G.R. No. 108228, February 1, 2001
Topics
contract of sale; sale of undivided interest
Summary
Co-owners of a land sold a portion already conveyed to another and effectively co-owned.
Doctrines
Even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale.
Facts
Salome, Consorcia, Alfredo, Maria, Rosalia, Jose, Quirico and Julita, all surnamed Bornales, were the original co-owners of Lot 162 of the Cadastral Survey of Pontevedra, Capiz under Original Certificate of Title No. 18047. As appearing therein, the lot, which consisted of a total area of 27,179 square meters was divided in aliquot shares among the eight (8) co-owners as follows:
Salome Bornales – 4/16
Consorcia Bornales – 4/16
Alfredo Bornales – 2/16
Maria Bornales – 2/16
Jose Bornales – 1/16
Quirico Bornales – 1/16
Rosalia Bornales – 1/16
Julita Bornales – 1/16
On July 14, 1940, Salome sold part of her 4/16 share in Lot 162 for P200.00 to Soledad Daynolo. In the Deed of Absolute Sale signed by Salome and two other co-owners, Consorcia and Alfredo, the portion of Lot 162 sold to Soledad was described with its metes and bounds
Thereafter, Soledad Daynolo immediately took possession of the land described above and built a house thereon.
A few years later, Soledad and her husband, Simplicio Distajo, mortgaged the subject portion of Lot 162 as security for a P400.00 debt to Jose Regalado, Sr.
On April 14, 1948, three of the eight co-owners of Lot 162, specifically, Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo, sold 24,993 square meters of said lot to Jose Regalado, Sr.
On May 4, 1951, Simplicio Distajo, heir of Soledad Daynolo who had since died, paid the mortgage debt and redeemed the mortgaged portion of Lot 162 from Jose Regalado, Sr. The latter, in turn, executed a Deed of Discharge of Mortgage in favor of Soledad’s heirs, namely: Simplicio Distajo, Rafael Distajo and Teresita Distajo-Regalado. On same date, the said heirs sold the redeemed portion of Lot 162 for P1,500.00 to herein petitioners, the spouses Manuel Del Campo and Salvacion Quiachon.
Meanwhile, Jose Regalado, Sr. caused the reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title No. 18047. The reconstituted OCT No. RO-4541 initially reflected the shares of the original co-owners in Lot 162. However, title was transferred later to Jose Regalado, Sr. who subdivided the entire property into smaller lots, each covered by a respective title in his name. One of these small lots is Lot No. 162-C-6 with an area of 11,732 square meters which was registered on February 24, 1977 under TCT No. 14566.
In 1987, petitioners Manuel and Salvacion del Campo brought this complaint for “repartition, resurvey and reconveyance” against the heirs of the now deceased Jose Regalado, Sr. Petitioners claimed that they owned an area of 1,544 square meters located within Lot 162-C-6 which was erroneously included in TCT No. 14566 in the name of Regalado. Petitioners alleged that they occupied the disputed area as residential dwelling ever since they purchased the property from the Distajos way back in 1951. They also declared the land for taxation purposes and paid the corresponding taxes.
On April 1, 1987, summons were served on Regalado’s widow, Josefina Buenvenida, and two of her children, Rosemarie and Antonio. Josefina and Rosemarie were declared in default on May 10, 1989 because only Antonio filed an answer to the complaint.
During trial, petitioners presented the Deed of Absolute Sale executed between Soledad Daynolo and Salome Bornales as well as the Deed of Mortgage and Deed of Discharge signed by Jose Regalado, Sr. The Deed of Absolute Sale showing the purchase by the Del Campos of the property from the Distajos was likewise given in evidence.
Despite the filing of an answer, Antonio failed to present any evidence to refute the claim of petitioners. Thus, after considering Antonio to have waived his opportunity to present evidence, the trial court deemed the case submitted for decision.
On November 20, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint. It held that while Salome could alienate her pro-indiviso share in Lot 162, she could not validly sell an undivided part thereof by meters and bounds to Soledad, from whom petitioners derived their title. The trial court also reasoned that petitioners could not have a better right to the property even if they were in physical possession of the same and declared the property for taxation purposes, because mere possession cannot defeat the right of the Regalados who had a Torrens title over the land.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment.
Issues
- Whether the the sale by a co-owner of a physical portion of an undivided property held in common be valid?
- Whether the respondent is estopped from denying petitioners’ right and title over the disputed area?
Ruling
- YES, with respect to the contract of sale between Salome and Soledad. The mere fact that Salome purportedly transferred a definite portion of the co-owned lot by metes and bounds to Soledad, however, does not per se render the sale a nullity. This much is evident under Article 49310 of the Civil Code and pertinent jurisprudence on the matter. More particularly in Lopez vs. Vda. De Cuaycong, et. al. which we find relevant, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Bocobo, held that:
…The fact that the agreement in question purported to sell a concrete portion of the hacienda does not render the sale void, for it is a well-established principle that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so. “Quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest.” (When a thing is of no force as I do it, it shall have as much force as it can have.)
Applying this principle to the instant case, there can be no doubt that the transaction entered into by Salome and Soledad could be legally recognized in its entirety since the object of the sale did not even exceed the ideal shares held by the former in the co-ownership.
As a matter of fact, the deed of sale executed between the parties expressly stipulated that the portion of Lot 162 sold to Soledad would be taken from Salome’s 4/16 undivided interest in said lot, which the latter could validly transfer in whole or in part even without the consent of the other co-owners.
Salome’s right to sell part of her undivided interest in the co-owned property is absolute in accordance with the well-settled doctrine that a co-owner has full ownership of his pro-indiviso share and has the right to alienate, assign or mortgage it, and substitute another person in its enjoymen.
Since Salome’s clear intention was to sell merely part of her aliquot share in Lot 162, in our view no valid objection can be made against it and the sale can be given effect to the full extent.
NO, with respect to the conveyance of the whole Lot 162 to Regalado, by Salome, Consorcia and Alberto to Jose Regalado. We are not unaware of the principle that a co-owner cannot rightfully dispose of a particular portion of a co-owned property prior to partition among all the co-owners.
However, this should not signify that the vendee does not acquire anything at all in case a physically segregated area of the co-owned lot is in fact sold to him. Since the co-owner/vendor’s undivided interest could properly be the object of the contract of sale between the parties, what the vendee obtains by virtue of such a sale are the same rights as the vendor had as co-owner, in an ideal share equivalent to the consideration given under their transaction.
In other words, the vendee steps into the shoes of the vendor as co-owner and acquires a proportionate abstract share in the property held in common.
Resultantly, Soledad became a co-owner of Lot 162 as of the year 1940 when the sale was made in her favor. It follows that Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could not have sold the entire Lot 162 to Jose Regalado, Sr. on April 14, 1948 because at that time, the ideal shares held by the three co-owners/vendors were equivalent to only 10/16 of the undivided property less the aliquot share previously sold by Salome to Soledad.
Based on the principle that “no one can give what he does not have,” Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could not legally sell the shares pertaining to Soledad since a co-owner cannot alienate more than his share in the co-ownership.
We have ruled many times that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner will only transfer the rights of said co-owner to the buyer, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
- NO. Respondents are estopped from asserting that they own the subject land in view of the Deed of Mortgage and Discharge of Mortgage executed between Regalado and petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest. As petitioners correctly contend, respondents are barred from making this assertion under the equitable principle of estoppel by deed, whereby a party to a deed and his privies are precluded from asserting as against the other and his privies any right or title in derogation of the deed, or from denying the truth of any material fact asserted in it. A perusal of the documents evidencing the mortgage would readily reveal that Soledad, as mortgagor, had declared herself absolute owner of the piece of land now being litigated. This declaration of fact was accepted by Regalado as mortgagee and accordingly, his heirs cannot now be permitted to deny it