G.R. No. 136438 (November 11, 2004)
Topics: Right of way; Objects outside the Commerce of Men
Summary:
Teofilo C. Villarico is the owner of a 66 square meter property in La Huerta, Paraaque City, Metro Manila. His lot is separated from Ninoy Aquino Avenue (the highway) by a section of public land. Part of it was taken by respondents and part by Marites’ Carinderia and Andok’s Litson Corporation.
The lot on which the stairways were built is unquestionably public property owned by the state. Petitioner has no legal claim to possession of the lot because he is its owner.
Doctrines:
Public use is “use that is not confined to privileged individuals, but is open to the indefinite public.” Records indicate that the site on which the stairways were constructed was intended to serve as a pedestrian bridge over the roadway. As a result, it is a piece of property in public ownership.
Property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and hence it: (1) cannot be alienated or leased or otherwise be the subject matter of contracts; (2) cannot be acquired by prescription against the State; (3) is not subject to attachment and execution; and (4) cannot be burdened by any voluntary easement.
Facts:
Teofilo C. Villarico, the petitioner, is the owner of a sixty-six (66) square meter property in La Huerta, Paranaque City, Metro Manila, which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (T.C.T.) No. 95453 issued by the Registry of Deeds in the same city.
The petitioner Villarico’s lot is separated from Ninoy Aquino Avenue (the highway) by a section of public land. The Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) built stairways at many points along this stretch of public land so that people could reach the highway because it was elevated by four (4) meters and therefore higher than the nearby areas.
On a piece of such government land, respondents Vivencio Sarmiento, his daughter Bessie Sarmiento, and her spouse Beth Del Mundo, erected a building sometime in 1991. Part of it was taken in November of the same year by Marites’ Carinderia and Andok’s Litson Corporation, who were both named as respondents.
By way of a Deed of Exchange of Real Property, the petitioner acquired the government’s 74.30 square meter piece of the same territory in 1993. He had the property recorded in the Parañaque City Registry of Deeds under T.C.T. No. 74430.
In 1995, petitioner Villarico filed a complaint for accion publiciana against respondents with the RTC, Branch 259, Paranaque City. He claimed, among other things, that the structures built by the defendants on government property blocked his “right of way” to Ninoy Aquino Avenue and infringed on a section of his property covered by T.C.T. No. 74430.
Respondents specifically refuted the claims made by the petitioner in their response, asserting that Parañaque City had granted those licenses and permissions to erect their structures there and that the petitioner had no rights to the subject property because it belonged to the government.
Issue:
Whether the disputed lot on which petitioner’s alleged “right of way” belongs to the state or property of public dominion.
Ruling:
The lot on which the petitioner claims to have a “right of way” is unquestionably public property or property owned by the state.
Property of public dominion is defined by Article 420 of the Civil Code as follows:
“ART. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character.
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.”
Public use is “use that is not confined to privileged individuals, but is open to the indefinite public.” Records indicate that the site on which the stairways were constructed was intended to serve as a pedestrian bridge over the roadway. As a result, it is a piece of property in public ownership.
Property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and hence it: (1) cannot be alienated or leased or otherwise be the subject matter of contracts; (2) cannot be acquired by prescription against the State; (3) is not subject to attachment and execution; and (4) cannot be burdened by any voluntary easement.
Given that the lot on which the stairways were built is public property, it cannot be burdened by a voluntarily granted right-of-way easement in the petitioner’s favor. In reality, the public’s usage of it is only tolerated by the government through the DPWH. Petitioner is not permitted to use it for personal gain. Indeed, he has no legal claim to possession of it.
Article 530 of the Civil Code which provides:
“ART. 530. Only things and rights which are susceptible of being appropriated may be the object of possession.”
The decision that respondents have a stronger right of possession over the subject lot was thus incorrect on the part of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals. The area of the same lot that is presently covered by T.C.T. No. 74430 in the petitioner’s name, however, was where the defendants’ structures were built, according to the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. He has the right to possess it because he is its owner.