G.R. No. 132305, December 4, 2001
Topics: contract of sale; impugning of filiation
Summary:
Petitioner asserts that she is the daughter of the deceased owner of the subject land and is entitled to succession.
Doctrines:
Art. 1471. If the price is simulated, the sale is void, but the act may be shown to have been in reality a donation, or some other act or contract.
Facts:
Jose T. Santiago owned a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 64729, located in Rizal Avenue Extension, Sta. Cruz, Manila. Alleging that Jose had fraudulently registered it in his name alone, his sisters Nicolasa and Amanda (now respondents herein) sued Jose for recovery of 2/3 share of the property.
On April 20, 1981, the trial court in that case decided in favor of the sisters, recognizing their right of ownership over portions of the property covered by TCT No. 64729. The Register of Deeds of Manila was required to include the names of Nicolasa and Amanda in the certificate of title to said property.
Jose died intestate on February 6, 1984. On August 5, 1987, respondents filed a complaint for recovery of title, ownership, and possession against herein petitioner, Ida C. Labagala, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, to, recover from her the 1/3 portion of said property pertaining to Jose but which came into petitioner’s sole possession upon Jose’s death.
Respondents alleged that Jose’s share in the property belong to them by operation of law because they are the only legal heirs of their brother, who died intestate and without issue. They claimed that the purported sale of the property made by their brother to petitioner sometime in March 1979 was executed through petitioner’s machinations and with malicious intent, to enable her to secure the corresponding transfer certificate of title (TCT No. 1723346) in petitioner’s name alone.
Respondents insisted that the deed of sale was a forgery . The deed showed that Jose affixed his thumbmark thereon, but respondents averred that, having been able to graduate from college, Jose never put his thumb mark on documents he executed but always signed his name in full. They claimed that Jose could not have sold the property belonging to his “poor and unschooled sisters, who …sacrificed for his studies and personal welfare.”
Respondents also pointed out that it is highly improbable for petitioner to have paid the supposed consideration of P150,000 for the sale of the subject property because petitioner was unemployed and without any visible means of livelihood at the time of the alleged sale. They also stressed that it was quite unusual and questionable that petitioner registered the deed of sale only on January 26, 1987, or almost eight years after the execution of the sale.
On the other hand, petitioner claimed that her true name is not Ida C. Labagala as claimed by respondent but Ida C. Santiago. She claimed not to know any person by the name of Ida C. Labagala. She claimed to be the daughter of Jose and thus entitled to his share in the subject property. She maintained that she had always stayed on the property, ever since she was a child.
She argued that the purported sale of the property was, in fact, a donation to her, and that nothing could have precluded Jose from putting his thumb mark on the deed of sale instead of his signature. She pointed out that during his lifetime, Jose never acknowledged respondents’ claim over the property, such that respondents had to sue to claim portions thereof. She lamented that respondents had to disclaim her in their desire to obtain ownership of the whole property.
Issues:
- Whether respondents may impugn petitioner’s filiation in this action for recovery of title and possession.
- Whether petitioner is entitled to Jose’s 1/3 portion of the property he co-owned with respondents, through succession, sale, or donation.
Ruling:
- No. We find petitioner’s reliance on Article 263 of the Civil Code to be misplaced. Said article provides:
Art. 263. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the recording of the birth in the Civil Register, if the husband should be in the same place, or in a proper case, any of his heirs.
If he or his heirs are absent, the period shall be eighteen months if they should reside in the Philippines; and two years if abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed, the term shall be counted from the discovery of the fraud.
Article 263 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to assert and prove that a person is not a man’s child by his wife. However, the present case is not one impugning petitioner’s legitimacy. Respondents are asserting not merely that petitioner is not a legitimate child of Jose, but that she is not a child of Jose at all. Moreover, the present action is one for recovery of title and possession, and thus outside the scope of Article 263 on prescriptive periods.
In this case, respondents are not assailing petitioner’s legitimate status but are, instead, asserting that she is not at all their brother’s child. The birth certificate presented by respondents support this allegation.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that:
The Certificate of Record of Birth (Exhibit H) plainly states that… Ida was the child of the spouses Leon Labagala and Cornelia Cabrigas. This document states that it was Leon Labagala who made the report to the Local Civil Registrar and therefore the supplier of the entries in said Certificate. Therefore, this certificate is proof of the filiation of Ida. Appellee however denies that Exhibit H is her Birth Certificate. She insists that she is not Ida Labagala but Ida Santiago. If Exhibit H is not her birth certificate, then where is hers? She did not present any though it would have been the easiest thing to do considering that according to her baptismal certificate she was born in Manila in 1969. This court rejects such denials and holds that Exhibit H is the certificate of the record of birth of appellee Ida…
Against such evidence, the appellee Ida could only present her testimony and a baptismal certificate (Exhibit 12) stating that appellee’s parents were Jose Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas. But then, a decisional rule in evidence states that a baptismal certificate is not a proof of the parentage of the baptized person. This document can only prove the identity of the baptized, the date and place of her baptism, the identities of the baptismal sponsors and the priest who administered the sacrament — nothing more.
Petitioner opted not to present her birth certificate to prove her relationship with Jose and instead offered in evidence her baptismal certificate. A baptismal certificate, a private document, is not conclusive proof of filiation.
Further, we note that petitioner, who claims to be Ida Santiago, has the same birthdate as Ida Labagala. The similarity is too uncanny to be a mere coincidence.
Thus, we are constrained to agree with the factual finding of the Court of Appeals that petitioner is in reality the child of Leon Labagala and Cornelia Cabrigas, and contrary to her averment, not of Jose Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas. Not being a child of Jose, it follows that petitioner can not inherit from him through intestate succession.
- No. On the validity of the purported deed of sale, however, we agree with the Court of Appeals that:
…This deed is shot through and through with so many intrinsic defects that a reasonable mind is inevitably led to the conclusion that it is fake. The intrinsic defects are extractable from the following questions:
a) If Jose Santiago intended to donate the properties in question to Ida, what was the big idea of hiding the nature of the contract in the facade of the sale?
b) If the deed is a genuine document, how could it have happened that Jose Santiago who was of course fully aware that he owned only 1/3 pro indiviso of the properties covered by his title sold or donated the whole properties to Ida?
c) Why in heaven’s name did Jose Santiago, a college graduate, who always signed his name in documents requiring his signature (citation omitted) affix his thumbmark on this deed of sale?
d) If Ida was the child of Jose Santiago, what was the sense of the latter donating his properties to her when she would inherit them anyway upon his death?
e) Why did Jose Santiago affix his thumbmark to a deed which falsely stated that: he was single (for he was earlier married to Esperanza Cabrigas ); Ida was of legal age (for she was then just 15 years old); and the subject properties were free from liens and encumbrances (for Entry No. 27261, Notice of Adverse Claim and Entry No. 6388, Notice of Lis Pendens were already annotated in the title of said properties). If the deed was executed in 1979, how come it surfaced only in 1984 after the death of Jose Santiago and of all people, the one in possession was the baptismal sponsor of Ida?
Clearly, there is no valid sale in this case. Jose did not have the right to transfer ownership of the entire property to petitioner since 2/3 thereof belonged to his sisters. Petitioner could not have given her consent to the contract, being a minor at the time. Consent of the contracting parties is among the essential requisites of a contract, including one of sale, absent which there can be no valid contract.
Moreover, petitioner admittedly did not pay any centavo for the property,31 which makes the sale void. Article 1471 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1471. If the price is simulated, the sale is void, but the act may be shown to have been in reality a donation, or some other act or contract.
Neither may the purported deed of sale be a valid deed of donation. Again, as explained by the Court of Appeals:
…Even assuming that the deed is genuine, it cannot be a valid donation. It lacks the acceptance of the donee required by Art. 725 of the Civil Code. Being a minor in 1979, the acceptance of the donation should have been made by her father, Leon Labagala or her mother Cornelia Cabrigas or her legal representative pursuant to Art. 741 of the same Code. No one of those mentioned in the law – in fact no one at all – accepted the “donation” for Ida.