G.R. No. 125172, June 26, 1998
Topics: contract of sale; sale of conjugal property
Summary:
Over the objection of private respondent and while she was in Manila seeking employment, her husband sold to the petitioners-spouses one half of their conjugal peoperty, consisting of their residence and the lot on which it stood.
Doctrines:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership properly shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (165a)
Facts:
Plaintiff Gilda Corpuz and defendant Judie Corpuz are legally married spouses. Sometime on February 14, 1983, the couple Gilda and Judie Corpuz, with plaintiff-wife Gilda Corpuz as vendee, bought a 421 sq. meter lot located in Barangay Gen. Paulino Santos (Bo. 1), Koronadal, South Cotabato.
Sometime on April 22, 1988, the couple Gilda and Judie Corpuz sold one-half portion of their lot to the defendants-spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang.
Plaintiff Gilda Corpuz left for Manila sometime in June 1989. She was trying to look for work abroad, in the Middle East. Unfortunately, she became a victim of an unscrupulous illegal recruiter. She was not able to go abroad. She stayed for sometime in Manila, however, coming back to Koronadal, South Cotabato, .on March 11, 1990.
After his wife’s departure for Manila, defendant Judie Corpuz seldom went home to the conjugal dwelling. He stayed most of the time at his place of work at Samahang Nayon Building, a hotel, restaurant, and a cooperative. Daughter Herriet Corpuz went to school at King’s College, Bo. 1, Koronadal, South Cotabato, but she was at the same time working as household helper.
Sometime in January 1990, Harriet Corpuz learned that her father intended to sell the remaining one-half portion including their house, of their homelot to defendants Guiangs. She wrote a letter to her mother informing her. She Gilda Corpuz replied that she was objecting to the sale. Harriet, however, did not inform her father about this; but instead gave the letter to Mrs. Luzviminda Guiang so that she Guiang would advise her father
However, in the absence of his wife Gilda Corpuz, defendant Judie Corpuz pushed through the sale of the remaining one-half portion of the subject lot.
Issue:
- Whether the assailed Deed of Transfer of Rights was validly executed
- Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not declaring as voidable contract under Art. 1390 of the Civil Code the impugned Deed of Transfer of Rights which was validly ratified thru the execution of the “amicable settlement” by the contending parties.
Ruling:
- Petitioners insist that the questioned Deed of Transfer of Rights was validly executed by the parties-litigants in good faith and for valuable consideration. The absence of private respondent’s consent merely rendered the Deed voidable under Article 1390 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 1390. The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though there may have been no damage to the contracting parties:
x x x x x x x x x
(2) Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud.
These contracts are binding, unless they are annulled by a proper action in court. They are susceptible of ratification.
The error in petitioners’ contention is evident. Article 1390, par. 2, refers to contracts visited by vices of consent, i.e., contracts which were entered into by a person whose consent was obtained and vitiated through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud. In this instance, private respondent’s consent to the contract of sale of their conjugal property was totally inexistent or absent.
This being the case, said contract properly falls within the ambit of Article 124 of the Family Code, which was correctly applied by the the lower court:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership properly shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (165a)
Comparing said law with its equivalent provision in the Civil Code, the trial court adroitly explained the amendatory effect of the above provision in this wise: 12
The legal provision is clear. The disposition or encumbrance is void. Under Article 166 of the Civil Code, the husband cannot generally alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent. The alienation or encumbrance if so made however is not null and void. It is merely voidable. The offended wife may bring an action to annul the said alienation or encumbrance. Thus, the provision of Article 173 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to wit:
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband.(n)
This particular provision giving the wife ten (10) years . . . during the marriage to annul the alienation or encumbrance was not carried over to the Family Code. It is thus clear that any alienation or encumbrance made after August 3, 1988 when the Family Code took effect by the husband of the conjugal partnership property without the consent of the wife is null and void.
Furthermore, it must be noted that the fraud and the intimidation referred to by petitioners were perpetrated in the execution of the document embodying the amicable settlement. Gilda Corpuz alleged during trial that barangay authorities made her sign said document through misrepresentation and coercion. In any event, its execution does not alter the void character of the deed of sale between the husband and the petitioners-spouses, as will be discussed later. The fact remains that such contract was entered into without the wife’s consent.
- Petitioners aver that it was duly ratified by the contending parties through the “amicable settlement” they executed on March 16, 1990 in Barangay Case No. 38.
The position is not well taken. The trial and the appellate courts have resolved this issue in favor of the private respondent. The trial court correctly held:
By the specific provision of the law Art. 1390, Civil Code therefore, the Deed to Transfer of Rights (Exh. “A”) cannot be ratified, even by an “amicable settlement”. The participation by some barangay authorities in the “amicable settlement” cannot otherwise validate an invalid act. Moreover, it cannot be denied that the “amicable settlement (Exh. “B”) entered into by plaintiff Gilda Corpuz and defendent spouses Guiang is a contract. It is a direct offshoot of the Deed of Transfer of Rights (Exh. “A”). By express provision of law, such a contract is also void. Thus, the legal provision, to wit:
Art. 1422. Acontract which is the direct result of a previous illegal contract, is also void and inexistent. (Civil Code of the Philippines).
In summation therefore, both the Deed of transfer of Rights (Exh. “A”) and the “amicable settlement” (Exh. “3”) are null and void.
Doctrinally and clearly, a void contract cannot be ratified.
Neither can the “amicable settlement” be considered a continuing offer that was accepted and perfected by the parties, following the last sentence of Article 124. The order of the pertinent events is clear: after the sale, petitioners filed a complaint for trespassing against private respondent, after which the barangay authorities secured an “amicable settlement” and petitioners filed before the MTC a motion for its execution. The settlement, however, does not mention a continuing offer to sell the property or an acceptance of such a continuing offer. Its tenor was to the effect that private respondent would vacate the property. By no stretch of the imagination, can the Court interpret this document as the acceptance mentioned in Article 124.